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This study first uses a set of graphs and tables to present the pattern of democracy in the 
world, using the Gastil Index. Then a statistical analysis is conducted by two techniques: 
Regression techniques are used to analyze the effect on democracy of a handful of variables. 
It shows that poverty, Communism and the Muslim culture are the main barriers to 
democracy. It then uses Bayesian probability methods to make explicit the concept of the 
“risk” of countries being undemocratic. The analysis focuses on the dynamics of the income 
effect and of the democratic deficit of the Muslim countries to see if it is stationary or 
transitory. It is unstable, so it may be transitory, but it has been rising.  
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1. Introduction 
A topic which increasingly preoccupies politicians, policy makers, and academics is the 
constellation of factors which determine the degree to which a country is democratic. Many 
theories and ideas purporting to explain the distribution of democracy among the countries of 
the world are in circulation. These theories may have important political consequences: for 
example, theories about the need to democratize the Middle East  – and the means of 
achieving this – appear to have been causal to the US war in Iraq. The following analysis tries 
to demonstrate that a few factors can explain a great deal of the variation in the extent of 
democracy in the world’s countries:  
We demonstrate that the l evel of national income provides the most important factor 
explaining inter-country variations in the degree of democracy with the consequence that low 
income is the most important barrier to democracy. When countries go through the Grand 
Transition from being a poor LDC (Less Developed Country) to becoming a wealthy DC 
(Developed Country) they undergo a democratic transition. We thus explain most of the 
strong correlation observed between the level of income and the degree of democracy as a 
causal relation from income to democracy.  
The literature also provides evidence that more democratic political structures leads to 
higher growth, and thus eventually to a high income level. Section 2 compares the typical 
quantitative findings with the pattern in the data that have to be explained. It concludes that 
most of the observed positive relation between democracy and income is due to high levels of 
income being conducive to the development of democratic institutions rather than to 
democratic institutions being conducive to income growth.  
However, even after allowing for the effects of inter-country variations in income on the 
distribution of the degree of democracy across countries, there remains a powerful cultural 
explanation for why some countries are more democratic than others. This is that a number of 
the world’s countries are Muslim in the sense that they have a Muslim majority and adopt 
Islam as their official religion. In this paper we study the dynamics of the relation between 
being a Muslim country and the degree of democracy.  
As is well known, communism and democracy make uneasy bedfellows. However, the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, the USSR, and the Russian empire have caused many, often new, 
countries to seek and to embrace a change in the economic and political systems that they 
were forced to adopt under communism. We show that countries going through the Small   3
Transition  – from a socialist to a market economy  – quickly converge to the level of 
democracy they would have had without socialism. 
At present we use the Gastil index, which is the democracy index that is most often used 
by economists,
1 notably in studies explaining growth. However, all results in the paper 
generalize to the Polity index (see Jensen and Paldam 2005) and to the Vanhanen index.
2 The 
statistical analysis uses two techniques: One is standard regression analysis. The second is the 
Bayesian probability theory, which concentrates on the concept of an (absolute) democratic 
deficit for a country group, and of a (relative) democratic gap between country groups.  
  Section 2 takes a look the data, and introduces the literature. It is argued that the strong 
correlation between income and democracy must to at least 80% due to causality from income 
to democracy. Section 3 gives regression results, concentrating on the effects of income. 
Section 4 looks at the risk of being democratically deprived concentrating on the effects of the 
Muslim culture. This section also contains a small survey of ideas that have been presented of 
why Muslim countries are less democratic. Finally, Section 5 gives some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Main patterns in the data and theories 
The two main data sets used are the Gastil index of democracy from Freedom House and the 
gdp data from Maddison (2003). 
 
The Gastil index, ?it, where i and t are indices for country and time, is available from 1972.
3 It 
takes the values between 1 and 7, where 1 is  full democracy and 7 is  full  dictatorship. 
Appendix Table A1 shows ? for 171 countries in 1972 and in 2004.  
GDP per capita is termed, gdp, and our income measure is yit = ln gdpit.  
 
The gdp-data set excludes some small countries, covered by the Gastil index. Also some 
countries have changed – notable due to the Small Transition. For most purposes we use an 
                                                 
 
1. Some examples are: Pacala et al (2003) use ? to show that increasing democracy led to a reduction of pollution 
emission. Paldam (2002) use ? to study the cross-country pattern of corruption, while Bjørnskov (2003) use ? to 
explain cross-country evidence on social capital and life satisfaction.  
2. The results for the Vanhanen data set are from in a MA thesis in Danish (Aarhus University, June 2006) by 
Meliha Mestrebasic.  
3. Freedom House has published an annual report since about 1950, covering all countries, on the state of 
political freedom. It is evaluated using a list of questions derived from the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The items are aggregated to two integers: One for Political Rights and the other for Civil Liberties. They 
are highly correlated, and we use the average that has 13 possible values: 1, 1½,…, 7. The index was developed 
by Raymond Gastil, who has now left the NGO.    4
unbalanced sample with a break in 1990: It has 135 countries before and 154 after the break. 
These data contains a balanced sample of 134 countries that is used, e.g. in Figure 1.  
 
2.1  The strong correlation of income and democracy 
Figure 1 plots the average ?-score computed over 1972-2005 for the 134 countries of the 
balanced sample against initial income, i.e. income in 1971 – the figure also shows two 























The figure shows a highly significant negative correlation where higher income is associated 
with more democracy. The figure is drawn to suggest that income “explains” the level of 
democracy. That is, we use initial income at the horizontal axis. The next two subsections will 
argue that this is a reasonable suggestion, based on the literature. 
 
                                                 
4. We have generated a set of such figure for other time periods such as 1972-88 and 1995-2005 to see how 
much the small transition matters. They all look rather similar.    5
2.2  Theory: Income Ł democracy: The democratic transition 
The literature about the causal link from income to democracy agrees that is a level effect. 
The Grand Transition of a country involves an increase of production by 30-40 times, and this 
changes everything, from the family structure to the structure of the economy, urbanization 
increases, corruption vanishes, etc.  
The democratic transition works through many channels: Democracy is demanded by 
everybody, but it is a luxury demand that, at low income, is dominated by more pressing 
needs. A high production requires education and international techniques and trade. With a 
highly educated and internationally oriented population, the demand for democracy further 
increases.
5 Also, the central controls to uphold dictatorship become more expensive relatively 
when production becomes more complex, and the share of the tertiary sector grows. 
The idea of a democratic transition originates from Lipset (1959). The subsequent 
discussion is surveyed in Lipset (1994) and Przeworski. All studies analyzing the relation – 
except Acemoglu et al (2005), discussed in Section 3.2 – find that the relation is strong and 
significant. In Section 3 we estimate a family of models of the democratic transition and show 
that they account fully for the pattern shown on Figure 1. 
 
2.3  Theory: Democracy Ł growth Ł income: Can it explain the pattern observed?  
The literature about the reverse causality is much larger. It studies the relation from 
democracy to growth. If monotonous, this connection will in due time generate a relation 
between democracy and the level of income. The Barro (1991) model (see Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2004; 528-529) concludes that the degree of democracy is a minor variable explaining 
growth. It only works in a convex version, with a peak in the middle. Consequently, it will 
never generate a relation between the level variables as shown.  
No less than 90 studies of this relation are covered by the new meta study by 
Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006), which concludes that most studies reject the convex 
form, and that the simple linear reduced  form gives an insignificant coefficient. However, 
several links via intermediate variables are significant, so there must be a small effect. Also, 
Sturm and Haan (2005) find a robust, but small, effect on growth.
6 We conclude that a 
                                                 
5. The importance of the role of openness has recently been explored by López-Córdova and Meissner (2005). 
6. Sturm and Haan classify a total of 59 variables according to their impact on growth using robust regressions as 
well as extreme bounds. Their results are broadly consistent with the results of the robustness analysis reported 
in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). The Gastil index is borderline robust, but it is not among the 10 variables 
with the largest impact. The average annual growth (in the gdp) is about 1.6% of which 1.2-1.4 can be explained, 
so it is clear that the impact of 1 Gastil point must be below 0.1 percentage points.    6
reasonable assessment based on the literature is that the effect of a fall of 1 point on the Gastil 
index is at most an increase in growth of 0.1 percentage points.  
From this assessment we can calculate the effect on the levels of incomes of the 
differences in the level of democracy we know existed 200 years ago. The Madisson data 
allow us to assess that the ratio of the highest to the lowest decile of income in 1700 and 1820 
was around 3. This fractile ratio has increased to 40 in 2000. Thus this measure of income 
dispersion has increased about 13 times in the last 200 years.   
The Polity democracy index, builds on less primary data, but it goes back to 1800 for a 
few countries. It tell us that the democracy level were much more similar in the 19
th than in 
the 20
th century, so when converted to Gastil points,
7 very few countries have differed by as 
much as 3 Gastil points in average over the last 200 years. A difference of 3 Gastil points over 
two centuries generates differences in income levels of 3 x 0.1 = 0.3% per year or 1.003
200 ˜ 
1.8. It thus explains at most 1.8/13 = 14% of the income differences that has developed since 
then. Consequently, the literature suggests that the correlation shown on Figure 1 must, to at 
least 85%, be due to the democratic transition. Thus, we shall treat the causality from the level 
of democracy to income as a (small) bias in the relation from income to democracy.  
 
 
Table 1. Average value of variables 
Countries covered  Number of  gdp for 2001  Average ?-score for 
  countries  y  log y  All years  Last 10 years 
Africa, SS  43  1727  3.10  5.26  4.60 
Latin American  22  5753  3.72  3.24  2.86 
Orient  16  8549  3.69  5.02  4.70 
    Of which Tigers  4  20865  4.31  3.39  2.63 
West  25  24301  4.38  1.30  1.17 
Others  50  5536  3.63  4.42  3.58 
Muslim  43  5080  3.47  5.51  5.50 
    Of which Arab   16  8869  3.79  5.65  5.83 
Communist  5  2252  3.31  6.71  6.80 
Transition (ex comm.)  28  6364  3.71  (5.11)  3.59 
Oil countries  20  9886  3.86  4.99  4.99 
All countries  171  7947  3.63  4.21  3.72 
Note:  All averages are unweighted. Gdp per capita is termed gdp. The average for the transition countries 5.11 
is in brackets as it makes little sense given the large difference between the score at the start and the end – 
this also affects 8 points on Figure 1. 
                                                 
7. The two indices are highly correlated, though independently compiled. Polity-points,  P, are converted to 
Gastil-points, ?, by the formula: ? = 4 – 0.3P, see Jensen and Paldam (2005).   7
2.4  Some additional cross country observations  
Figure 1 allows three additional observations: (1) All countries with “full” democracy are in 
the high end of the income scale. (2) While Muslim countries are similar to other countries 
with low income, there is no tendency that they become more democratic with rising income. 
(3) The five countries with communist governments throughout are very undemocratic. The 
figure suggests further explanations. The black diamonds to the right are the three small oil 
countries, UAE, Qatar and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are also important in the picture 
for the Muslim countries, so the relation has to be controlled for oil wealth.  
  Table 1 shows the distribution of the average of the variables analyzed. For now we 
only consider the two last columns showing averages for the ?-index. (5) The average score is 
4.21 for all 32 years, and 3.72 for the last 10 years. It is close to the middle of the scale (4 
points) from no to full democracy. (6) The Western countries are relatively democratic, as 
expected. Also, the Latin American group and the Asian Tigers appear as relatively 
democratic. (7) Several groups have low scores; but once they are controlled for income, only 
two groups remain significant Communist and Muslim countries, where the core group of 
Arab countries is (even) less democratic than the average. 
 
 














Note: The four groups of countries follow the World Bank classification in low income (Poor), lower and higher 
middle income (low MIC and High MIC) and high income (Rich). The High MIC group contains many of the 
Communist countries which are now in transition. These countries have been deleted in the Exc Com line.   8
2.5  The development from 1972 to 2004 
The development from 1972 to 2004 of the average ?’s for the 4 income groups of countries 
in the World Bank classification (see note to figure) is shown in Figure 2. All 4 curves have a 
(significant) negative slope indicating increasing democracy in the world in the period. The 
increase for the average country is about 0.028 points a year or 0.9 point on the scale over the 
33 years. This can be “explained” by the increase in gdp as will be shown in Section 3. 
  The relative positions of the four curves also support the idea that the Grand Transition 
leads to a democratic transition, as the ?-level for the four income groups differs precisely as 
predicted by the law. The only deviation from the picture is the curve for the High MIC group 
that intersects with the Low MIC group before 1990. This is due to the transition of 10 (Ex) 
Communist countries in the  High MIC group. The  Exc Com line shows how the curve 
changes when the 10 countries are excluded. If the remaining 18 transition countries are 
excluded from the other groups, the changes are far smaller. 
 
 















Note:  The 28 countries of the transition group are marked with T – They are not included in the three groups. 
   9
2.6  The Small Transition: Choosing a new political system   
The data include 14 countries with a Communist government from 1972 to 1988. Several of 
these countries broke up in the early 1990s to form 33 countries. Five still have a Communist 
regime. The remaining 28 countries form the Transition group. For these countries the big 
political change came in the form of a sudden collapse of the old political system in 1988-90 
and concomitant loss of centralized control in the countries of Eastern Europe and the 
erstwhile countries of the USSR. The development of the new political order in these 
countries thus has the character of a fine historical experiment. 
  Figure 3 has 3 fat lines for Communist, Muslim and Other countries. When the thin 
straight lines shown are fitted through these points the slopes are positively significant for 
Communist, positively insignificant for Muslim and negative and (numerically) much larger 
for Other.
8 The figure thus shows the growing Muslim gap, which is exclusively due to the 
democratization in the non-Muslim world, while the level of dictatorship is unchanged in the 
Muslim world.  
  Figure 3 further has two thinner lines showing that the 28 transition (T) countries 
quickly converge to the position at which they might have been without the previous 
Communist regimes. The Muslim T group
9 had a short “democratic spring” from 1990 to 
1992, and then they moved to the typical Muslim level of dictatorship (around 5.5). The Other 
T group has shown a year-on-year improvement in democratization, and they are now at the 
same level as all Other countries. The last Communist countries have remained at low levels 
of democracy. 
 
2.7  An alternative approach to the development over time 
The United Nations classifies countries depending on their HDI, Human Development Index, 
as: High HDI; medium HDI; and low HDI. We use a similar approach to classify countries 
depending upon the value of their ?, as: Highly democratic (? < 3); moderately democratic (3 
= ? < 6); and undemocratic (? = 6).
10 Table A1 in the Appendix shows the classification of 
countries for the start (1972) and end (2004) years of our sample.  
                                                 
8. The slopes for the 3 regression lines shown are 0.007 (2.5), 0.003 (1.1) and -0.037 (-21.6), for Communist, 
Muslim and Other, respectively. Brackets give t-rations.  
9. The Muslim group consists of Albania and six states of the erstwhile Soviet Union: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The Other group consists of Mongolia and the Christian 
countries of Eastern Europe and Caucasus. 
10. Freedom House use a similar classification.   10
Table 2. The world’s Democratic Deficit: 1972-2004. Two percentages: 
DD1 undemocratic and DD2 not highly democratic 
Year  DD1  DD2    Year  DD1  DD2    Year  DD1  DD2 
1972  42.7  73.1    1983  39.2  74.9    1994  24.6  65.5 
1973  41.5  72.5    1984  39.2  73.7    1995  24.6  65.5 
1974  40.4  73.7    1985  39.2  71.9    1996  24.0  63.7 
1975  41.5  76.0    1986  38.0  71.9    1997  24.6  63.2 
1976  43.3  76.0    1987  36.8  71.3    1998  20.5  59.6 
1977  36.3  74.3    1988  31.0  70.8    1999  18.7  60.8 
1978  37.4  74.3    1989  27.5  70.8    2000  17.5  59.1 
1979  37.4  73.7    1990  19.3  68.4    2001  18.1  59.6 
1980  39.8  74.3    1991  16.4  62.6    2002  15.8  57.3 
1981  39.2  74.9    1992  18.7  63.7    2003  16.4  57.9 
1982  37.4  70.2    1993  24.0  67.3    2004  14.0  57.9 
 
 
We define the world’s democratic deficit in two ways. DD1 is the fraction of undemocratic 
countries, and DD2 is the fraction of countries which are not highly democratic. The number 
of countries in the three democracy categories in 1972 were 46 (high), 52 (moderate), and 73 
(undemocratic), so that DD1 = 73/172 ˜ 42.7% and DD2 = (171-46)/171 ˜ 73.1%. Table 2 
shows how these fractions decrease.
11 
 
3. The democratic transition and the effect of some other variables  
When we want to model and estimate the effect of a set of variables – notably income – on 
the level of democracy, as given by the ?-index, three main problems are immediately evident:  
  (i) The adjustment problem: Political systems have the property of stepwise stability, so 
? is a variable with much inertia. When we estimate models, where ? is explained by other 
variables, it is a problem if ? adjusts to the changes in these variables within the time horizon, 
of T years, considered. 
  (ii) The variable choice problem: Many variables may in principle explain ?, and as we 
are studying the dynamic effect of variables this will soon exceed the space of an article. At 
present, we concentrate on the five explanatory variables found to be the most powerful ones 
in Paldam (2005). They are listed in Table 3.  
  (iii) As mentioned, we need to correct the regressions for simultaneity. In view of the 
literature discussed in 2.3 this is likely to give a small bias only. It is estimated in Section 3.5.   11
Table 3. Models and variables used 








itititiiiit yMusComOilu gadgblll -- =++++++   (2)  Dynamic  T = 1,…,16, 32 
123 /(1),for ,, , , 
TTTTTTTT zzz dablll
¥ =-=   (3)  Steady states of coefficients in (2) 
0
0 (), tt Ptt d - -=  where  1/ () TT dd »   (4)  Adjustment path for democracy 
income  T
it g   Gastil index, averaged over T years starting in t  Mus  binary dummy for Muslim country 
1 it g -   initial Gastil index used as adjustment term in (3)  Com  binary dummy for Communist country 
11 , iti yy --   initial income, ln to gdp with one lag  Oil  binary dummy for major oil exporter 
gdp  GDP per capita 
it u   Residuals 
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(3) and (4) are calculated from (2). The adjustment path in (4) is to a permanent rise of income at t = t0.  
Countries are Mus, if they have a clear Muslim majority and a Muslim government. Countries are Com, if they 
are a one party state ruled by a Communist Party, and Oil is used for countries belonging to OPEC during the 
period (or part of the period). 
 
3.1   Two models and four equations  
The equations and variables of Table 3 are used to handle these problems. It is difficult to 
correct the regressions for all possible problems at the same time.
12 We therefore use a family 
of models – listed in Table 3 – which are likely to span the area of reasonable estimates so 
that we can be confident that the true results are within the (small) range of the estimates. 
We use either cross country or the unbalanced panel over all 33 years in the estimates, 
working with a static (1) and a dynamic (2) version of the same equation. The difference is 
the adjustment term,  1
T
it dg- , for the initial level of democracy. The cross-country estimates 
represent long-run differences – i.e. the GT-pattern – and country heterogeneity, of which we 
control for a few of the systematic differences between groups of countries. However, (2) use 
the dynamics over the 33 years to estimate steady state states that also allow for full 
adjustment to income in the average country. We have estimated both equations (1) and (2) as 
cross sections and as panels for T = 1, …, 11 and 16. The results are bulky, but they have a 
clear pattern, which will be illustrated by typical results. More results are given in Paldam 
(2006). 
                                                                                                                                                         
11. Note that we have kept the number of countries constant by including the members of unions that have 
broken up (USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) as “countries” in 1972 to make the comparison reasonable. 
12. A background note (Paldam 2006) reestimates the equations with fixed effects, and corrects for 
heteroscedasticity and for the semi qualitative nature of the data (by Tobit regression). The results are basically 
the same.   12
Equation (1) is the static version, where the political system only adjusts within the 
period T. It thus catches the long run pattern in development to the extent that the Grand 
Transition view is true, and the  short run effects of income within T. Thus, we use the 
estimates for T = 1 to study the path of adjustment for the coefficients. The 33 estimates are 
given in appendix Table A2.  
Equation (2) is the dynamic version, which contains the adjustment term. It estimates 
the adjustment of democracy to income changes in the average country. The estimates from 
(2) have the advantage that it can be used to calculate the two key properties of the dynamics 
of adjustment. Equation (3) gives the steady state values of the effects on the variables in the 
average country of an income change. Equation (4) gives the path of adjustment of the level 
of democracy to a permanent income rise.  
We take it to be a strong result confirming the theory of the democratic transition, if the 
long run estimates from (1), ß*, and the implied steady state values, ß
8 from (2) are similar. 
 
3.2  The estimates of the income effects and the choice of time period T 
We first consider the static estimates, i.e. model (1), giving the range of ß
T* for different Ts. 
Table A2 give 33 estimates of ß
1*. The variation over time of the 33 estimates is discussed in 
Section 3.7. The average of these values of the effect of income is ß
1* = –1.10. Table 4 gives 
results for two period for T = 16, and for the two period panels for two versions of the model. 
They are all very close, especially for income, where all 6 estimates are about ß
16* = –1.1, as 
was also the result reached in Table A2, and the results are also very similar for the other Ts 
tried. Consequently, the GT-estimate is robust to T and it is ß
* = –1.1.  
 
 
Table 4. Model (1), for T = 16. Cross-country and panel estimates 
  Period 1  Period 2  Both  Period 1  Period 2  Both  Average 
  1973-88  1989-04  as panel  1973-88  1989-04  as panel  of line 
Initial y  -1.13  -1.06  -1.10  -1.22  -0.95  -1.08  -1.09 
  t-ratio  (-9.3)  (-9.8)  (-13.6)  (-11.9)  (-10.9)  (-16.2)   
Mus        0.81  1.47  1.15  1.14 
  t-ratio        (3.2)  (6.6)  (6.8)   
Oil        1.55  1.33  1.41  1.43 
  t-ratio        (4.6)  (4.69  (6.4)   
Com        2.47  3.02  2.63  2.71 
  t-ratio        (7.2)  (5.8)  (9.2)   
Period 1  13.32    13.02  13.38    12.16  12.97 
  t-ratio  (13.7)    (20.0)  (16.3)    (22.5)   
Period 2    12.43  12.69    10.83  11.99  11.99   13
  t-ratio    (14.0)  (19.0)    (15.1)  (21.7)   
R
2 adjusted  0.37  0.36  0.38  0.60  0.63  0.62   
N  149  168  317  149  168  317   
  Note: Coefficients that are significant at the 5% level are bolded.   14
Next we turn to the dynamic estimates, i.e. to model (2). The estimation is more fragile, as 
problems occur if T is too large or too small. If T is large, income fluctuates between the 
initial value used as regressor and the end of T. Hence for too large Ts the relation becomes 
imprecise. If T is too small, the inertia in the ?-series causes the coefficient 
T d to the initial ?-
index to get so close to 1 that nothing is left to explain for the other variables,
13 and their 
coefficients vanish as T goes to zero. We have found that many of the cross-country results 
for  T < 8 give nonsensical results. However, for the panel estimates the number of 
observations, N, in the regression is the average number of countries (143) times the number 
of periods in the panel, 33/T. Consequently, as T falls, N rises strongly and reaches 4728 for T 
= 1. This allows us to obtain panel estimates also for small Ts.  
 
 
Figure 4. Panel estimates of the short and long run effect of income,   and 
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and the adjustment coefficient,  shown as (1)
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Note:  The gray curves are for the model with the controls Mus, Com and Oil. The black curves are for the 
model with no controls. All 20 estimates have fixed effects for time. The estimates for T = 1 uses N = 
4728 observations. As T increases, N falls till N = 424 for T = 11. 
 
Figure 4 shows the panel estimates for model (2) of  ,
TT db and  b
¥
 for T = 1,…, 11. All 
estimates depicted on the figure are significant well above the 1% level. Even when the 
                                                 
13. Paldam (2006) calculates the correlations  it-1 (,)
TT
it rr gg =  for a range of Ts for 154 countries. 
1 0.96 r = . As 
T grows, r falls slowly, 
8 0.85. r =  First 
16 0.8. r <  When r is too close to 1, the relation comes close to a unit 
root and can only be made with a lot of observations giving high precision.    15
estimate of 
1 d  is close to 1, and 
1 b  is close to 0, they are sufficiently precise to give 
estimates of  b
¥
. We note that all 
T b
¥
 fluctuate around  –1.1. For larger Ts, the estimate 
increases marginally.  
 
 
Table 5. Model (2), with adjustment and steady state calculations, for T = 16 
  Period 1  Period 2  Both  Period 1  Period 2  Both  Average 
  1973-88  1989-04  as panel  1973-88  1989-04  as panel  of line 
Initial ?  0.72  0.57  0.65  0.61  0.41  0.49  0.57 
  t-ratio  (17.2)  (9.9)  (17.9)  (12.8)  (8.1)  (13.8)   
Initial y  -0.42  -0.41  -0.40  -0.55  -0.50  -0.54  -0.47 
  t-ratio  (-5.2)  (-3.8)  (-5.9)  (-6.2)  (-5.5)  (-8.3)   
Mus        0.53  1.18  0.85  0.85 
  t-ratio        (3.0)  (6.1)  (6.3)   
Oil        0.45  0.94  0.74  0.71 
  t-ratio        (1.8)  (3.7)  (4.1)   
Com        0.93  2.35  1.50  1.59 
  t-ratio        (3.5)  (5.2)  (6.3)   
Period 1  4.55    4.72  5.76    6.06  5.27 
  t-ratio  (6.0)    (7.3)  (7.0)    (9.9)   
Period 2    4.62  4.24    5.61  5.70  5.04 
  t-ratio    (4.4)  (6.4)    (6.3)  (9.0)   
R
2 adjusted  0.79  0.60  0.69  0.82  0.75  0.77   
N  149  168  317  149  168  317   
  Implied steady state effects from model (3):
1616 /(1) zz b
¥ =-    
Income  -1.53  -0.96  -1.15  -1.39  -0.84  -1.07  -1.16 
Mus        1.34  1.98  1.68  1.67 
Oil        1.16  1.57  1.45  1.39 
Com        2.38  3.96  2.94  3.09 
Period 1  16.44    13.42  14.67    11.92  14.11 
Period 2    10.82  12.04    9.44  11.21  10.88 
 
 
The adjustment term reduces country heterogeneity greatly in the regressions. It can be further 
reduced by adding fixed effects for countries. However, this brings the regressions closer to 
the unit root and causes the estimates to frequently vanish (or crash). Even the very stable   16
coefficient to income vanishes if small Ts are combined with fixed effects for countries. 
However, for  T > 12 the usual results remain also with fixed effects for countries, as 
documented in Paldam (2006).  
  The estimates of Acemoglu et al (2005) are – as they point out – the first which show 
that the effect of income in relations of type (2) is weak.
14 Their analysis uses T = 5, and fixed 
effects for time and countries. It is in accordance with our results that it makes the effects of 
income vanish, but in view of the above analysis this is not a hard blow to the findings that 
income is a strong causal factor explaining democracy.  
The summary of results in Table 6 conclude that the long run effect of income is 
1.150.1 -– . It is a robust finding, and, as both the literature survey and section 3.5 below 
show that the counter causality can at most cause a small fall in this estimate, so we conclude: 
The true long run effect of income is –1.1. In Section 3.3 we show that this means that the 
democratic transition neatly explains the main pattern shown on Figure 1. 
 
 
Table 6. Comparison of results from Table A2 and Tables 4 and 5 
Column  1  2  3  4  5  Assessment: 
Refer Table 3  Eq. (1)  Eq. (2)  Eq. (3a)  Eq. (3b)  Eq. (2)  Best long- 
From   Table A2  Table 4  Table 5  Table 5  (a)  run estimate 
T  1  16  16  8  32   
Constant  12.3  12.5   5.2  12.4   9.4    
Income  -1.1  -1.1  -0.5  -1.2  -1.6    1.150.1 -–  
Muslim   1.1   1.1   0.9   1.7   1.7   1.7 growing (b) 
Oil   1.4  1.4   0.7   1.4   1.4   1.4 (b) 
Communist   2.7  2.7   1.6   3.1   3.0   3.0, lower 1985-90 
Notes: (a) From Paldam (2005). (b) some multicollinearity.   
 
 
3.3  Other results: The three binary variables 
Most results in Tables A2, 4 and 5 are significant and give a clear picture summarized in 
Table 6. We have already discussed the effect of income. We now turn to the effects of the 
three binary variables. For most countries they are constant, but neither is constant for all 
countries. Most changes are in 1990. However, the effects of these changes are too few to 
allow powerful estimates of the dynamics, as do the estimates of the effects of income. 
   
                                                 
14. The results of Acemoglu et al (2005) fit into a larger picture as Daron Acemoglu and his group is arguing the 
Primacy of Institutions view, which contrasts to the Grand Transition view. The relation between the views is 
discussed in Paldam and Gundlach (2006).   17
Not unexpectedly, Com gives about 3 Gastil points. This effect may be due to socialism as 
such, i.e. of state ownership, or historical circumstances. No data set exists for the degree of 
state ownership, though one of the items in the Fraser Index is close. Our assessment is that 
the results for Com generalize, but this is a longer story which is not to be included. 
  Finally there is the Muslim/Oil complex. Both variables are nearly always significant, 
but do have some multicollinarity. The coefficient to Oil is very stable, but the coefficient to 
Muslim increases in size over time as appears likely from Figure 3. 
   We may see oil wealth as a way of becoming rich without going through the Grand 
Transition, though it is clear that great changes do occur in the societies that are hit by great 
oil wealth. Also, we note that the 4 Oil countries in Latin America (Venezuela, Ecuador, 
Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago) are as democratic as they should be given their income. 
 
3.4  The long path of adjustment 
The 28 estimates of 
11/
()
TT ddd == given on Figure 4 and in Table 5 allow us to calculate the 
adjustment speed to a jump in income. The average and standard deviation of the 28 estimates 
isd »0.965 (0.011). This implies the adjustment paths shown on Figure 5.
15 Obviously, even 
as small differences as 0.011 do give a large effect on an exponential process over 100 years. 
We also know that a large arbitrary element enters into political reform processes, so the 
fairly broad intervals between the 5 curves drawn on Figure 5 also represent a fact of the real 
world – not just estimation problems.  
 










                                                 
15. The curves on Figure 5 can be used to simulate the political effects of periods of rapid or slow growth.    18
  It is clear that the estimates do show much slower adjustments than normally found in 
economic models. The mean finding is that it takes no less than 20 years for half of the 
adjustment to have happened; and for 90% to have taken place, we have to consider more 
than half a century. This is important to keep in mind, and it neatly explains the much delayed 
democratic reforms caused by the extraordinarily rapid growth of the Asian Tigers. 
 
3.5  Using the results to explain the pattern on Figures 1 and 2  
It is a key result for i ncome is thus that we find the same result in the cross country 
regressions (1) giving the GT-long run estimates, and for the steady state results calculated 
from the dynamic estimates (2) for the average country. This result explains the pattern found 
on Figures 1 and 2: 
  Figure 1 suggests that the Grand Transition gives a fall in the ?-index of about 4 points. 
We know from Maddison (2001) that it increases income by about 40 times. Consequently, 
the Gastil index should fall by  1.1ln404 -￿=-  points, very much as it does.  
  Figure 2 shows that the Gastil index fell by almost 1 point from 1972 to 2004, where 
World income per capita grew by 67%. This should give a fall of  1.1ln1.670.6 -￿=  points in 
the period. This is less than the fall shown on Figure 2; but income growth was faster in the 
previous 20 years, so some of the fall is a late adjustment to that rise, as predicted by Figure 5. 
 
 
Table 7. The simultaneity bias 
See Table 5  OLS  2SLS
a 
Initial ?  0.41  0.43 
t-ratio  (8.1)  (8.2) 
Initial y  -0.50  -0.43 
t-ratio  (-5.5)  (-4.2) 
Mus  1.18  1.19 
t-ratio  (6.1)  (6.2) 
Oil  0.94  0.88 
t-ratio  (3.7)  (3.5) 
Com  2.35  2.35 
t-ratio  (5.2)  (5.2) 
Period 2  5.61  4.88 
t-ratio  (6.3)  (4.9) 
R
2 adjusted  0.75  0.74 
N  168  168 
Note a: The variables of period 1 are used as instruments for y-1. 
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3.6  Checking for counter causality 
The estimates in the preceding section may suffer from a counter-causality bias. The bias is 
reduced by using initial gdp, but due to the inertia in the series, there may be some 
simultaneity left. Table 7 gives a standard two-stage least square estimate of the model for 
period 2 – using the variables of period 1 as instruments for  1 it y - .
16 For easy comparison we 
repeat the appropriate column from Table 5. The coefficients move as predicted, but the bias 
is insignificant, as also predicted from the literature cited at the start of Section 2. 
 
3.7  The movements in the coefficients from annual cross section estimates  
Table A2 in the Appendix gives cross-country estimates of the effects for every year. Figures 
6 and 7 show the way two of these coefficients move over time. The break in the two curves 
is due to the change in the number of countries during the transition from Socialism. The 
curves are surrounded by a confidence interval of approx. 95%.  
  The coefficient Income moves a little, but not systematically. We have argued that the 
coefficient on income should be somewhat unstable due to slow adjustments.  
 
 













                                                 
16. When yt-1 is used to explain 
T
t g the average lag is 1 + 16/2 = 9 years. Hence, the simultaneity bias is likely to 
be small. When an additional lag of 16 years is used for the instruments (that is 2t-2  and  t y g - ), it is hard to 
imagine that any simultaneity bias remains.    20














It is much more interesting that the coefficient on Muslim moves so much. Figure 3 shows 
that the movements in the Muslim gap are caused by movements in the other variables – this 
probably generates the dynamics. The upward trend in the effect of Muslim culture on the ?-
score is significant. It looks as if it may have peaked in 1998, but the downturn is not 
significant.  
 
4. The risk calculations and some explanations of the Muslim gap  
We now return to the calculations from 2.6 above and give them into a Bayesian 
interpretation. We shall here look at the risk of being undemocratic   
 
4.1  The risk of being undemocratic 
Let   and   MM denote, respectively, the events that a country is, is not, a Muslim country, and 
let   and  UU  denote, respectively, the events that a country is, is not, undemocratic. Then, the 
probability that a country is /is not undemocratic, given that it is a Muslim country, is: 
 
()()()()





==   
We can now define the six probability ratios of Table 8. Using these ratios, it is easy to 
calculate the relevant probabilities: 
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Table 8. Six definitions, for the probability ratios of “undemocratic” and “Muslim” 
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The risk ratio  r  is the risk of being undemocratic for a Muslim country:  







rbw ===   
which is the relevant Bayes’ Factor times the odds ratio, where the Bayes’ Factor provides a 
measure of whether the data (the religion of the country) have increased or decreased the odds 
of the null hypothesis (U: the country is undemocratic) against the alternative hypothesis (U : 
the country is not undemocratic): 1, M b >  signifies that the odds of being undemocratic, 
relative to not being undemocratic, increase if the country i s Muslim;  1, M b <  signifies that 
the odds decrease (see Matthews, 2000). 
  An alternative view of the risk of a Muslim country being undemocratic is provided by 
posing the following question: given two countries – one Muslim, the other not – what is the 
ratio of their probabilities (as shown in Figure 6) of being undemocratic? In order to answer 
this question, the relevant “risk ratio”  s : given two different “pieces” of information – one 
country is Muslim, the other is not – what is the ratio of probabilities that the null hypothesis, 









==·=·=   (3)  
where  M l is the inverse Bayes’ Factor applied to countries which are undemocratic. 
Intuitively, the inverse Bayes’ Factor is the odds-ratio of the null hypothesis being true (a 
country is undemocratic) under one set of data (the country is Muslim), against it being true 
under a complementary set of data (the country is not Muslim). If  1(1) M l ><then, given that 
a country is undemocratic, it is more (less) likely to be Muslim than non-Muslim.  
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4.2  Conditional probabilities 
The upper panel of Table 9 shows, for Muslim countries, the values of the Risk Ratio and the 
Bayes’ Factor, and the lower panel shows the values of the “inverse” Risk Ratio and the 
“inverse” Bayes’ Factor for four years: 1972, 1980, 1990, and 2004. The upper panel shows 
that in 1972 57 percent of the Muslim countries which were undemocratic (P(U|M) = 0.57), 
the remaining 43 percent being highly/moderately democratic  () PUM= 0.43). This yielded a 
Risk Ratio of 1.33: the chance of a Muslim country being undemocratic was one-third higher 
than the chance of it being highly/moderately democratic.  
 
 
Table 9. Risk Ratio and Bayes’ Factor, and Inverse Risk Ratio 
and Inverse Bayes’ Factor. Calculations for Muslim Countries 
Probabilities  Calculation:  1972  1980  1990  2004 
Undemocratic, Muslim  () PUM  0.48  0.47  0.31  0.31 
HM democratic, Muslim  () PUM  0.52  0.53  0.69  0.69 
Risk ratio  ()/() PUMPUM r =   1.33  1.22  0.45  0.45 
Odds Ratio  ()/(1()) PUPU -   0.75  0.66  0.24  0.20 
Bayes’ Factor  (|)/(|) M PMUPMU b =   1.77  1.85  1.88  2.30 
Undemocratic, Muslim  () PUM  0.57  0.55  0.31  0.31 
Democratic non-Muslim  () PUM
 
0.38  0.35  0.16  0.12 
Inverse risk ratio  ()/(()) PUMPUM s =   1.50  1.57  1.94  2.58 
Inverse odds ratio  ()/(1()) M PMPM w =-   0.33  0.33  0.33  0.33 
Inverse Bayes’ factor  ()/() M PMUPMU l =   0.50  0.52  0.64  0.85 
   Note: See Table 5 and text. The abbreviation “HM” means “highly and moderately”. 
 
 
The risk ratio is compared to the odds ratio – which is the ratio of the number of undemocratic 
to highly/moderately democratic countries – to arrive at the Bayes’ Factor. If the Bayes’ 
Factor (the risk ratio divided by the odds ratio) was greater than 1, then a country which was 
undemocratic was more  likely to be Muslim than one which was highly/moderately 
democratic.
17 The upper panel of Table 9 shows that the Bayes’ Factor was not only greater 
than 1, but also increased over the period 1972-2004. The risk of a Muslim country being 
undemocratic fell over 1972-2004 to the extent that, by 2004, the chance of a Muslim country 
being undemocratic was less than half the chance of it being highly/moderately democratic 
(Risk Ratio = 0.45). But, and this is the important point, the supply of undemocratic countries 
                                                 
17. Conversely, if the Bayes’ factor was less than 1, then a country which was highly/moderately democratic was 
more likely to be Muslim than one which was undemocratic.   23
shrank even faster so that, by 2004, only 20 percent of countries in the world were undemo-
cratic (Odds Ratio = 0.20). The consequence was that in 2004, a country which was undemo-
cratic was more than twice as likely to be Muslim as one which was highly/moderately 
democratic (Bayes’ Factor = 2.3).  
  The lower panel of Table 9 shows that, in 1972, the chance of a Muslim country being 
undemocratic was 50 percent higher than the chance of a non-Muslim country (inverse Risk 
Ratio=1.5). Furthermore, the inverse Risk Ratio increased over 1972-2004 so that by 2004, 
the chance of a Muslim country being undemocratic was nearly three times the chance of a 
non-Muslim country (inverse Risk Ratio = 2.58).  
However, the greater chance of a Muslim country, compared to a non-Muslim country, 
being undemocratic has to be set against the fact that Muslim countries constituted a minority 
of the world’s countries: the Inverse Odds Ratio shows that the ratio of Muslim to non-
Muslim countries was 0.33. Consequently, given that a country was undemocratic, it was less 
likely to be Muslim than non-Muslim, i.e. the inverse Bayes’ factor was less than unity. 
However, the inverse Bayes’ factor was rising over time so that by 2004, even though only a 
third of the world’s countries were Muslim, the chance of an undemocratic country being 
Muslim was 85 percent of the chance of an undemocratic country being non-Muslim.  
 
4.3  Explaining the gap: Some observations 
The analysis shows that a significant gap has emerged between the level of democracy in the 
Muslim World and the rest of the World. It is an old gap, but it has grown, and it is now larger 
than ever before – see Jensen & Paldam (2005) for a perspective of the full 20
th century. The 
growth of the gap is due to the democratic transition in the non-Muslim countries, which we 
ascribed to economic growth. Wealth also increases in the Muslim World (almost as the 
average country), but here it does not generate democracy. This explanation suggests that the 
gap will continue growing – that is, the small decrease that has occurred since 1998 may not 
be a sign of a kink.  
  This begs the question of why Muslim countries are seemingly immune to the democra-
tic transition happening elsewhere. We are able to dig one step deeper and still be on an empi-
rical basis by looking at the relevant tables of the World Value Surveys.
18 Two points should 
be noted: (a) The items measuring people’s democratic values show little difference between 
people in Muslim and other countries. (b) However, the items dealing with secularization, i.e. 
                                                 
18. See Inglehart et al (2004). Especially F034, F063, F064 and F102 are relevant.    24
the relation between the state and religion, show that Muslims differ from most others in the 
sense that Muslims reject secularization and demand a religious factor in politics. 
  Comparing the traditions of two big Middle Eastern monotheistic religions, it is perhaps 
also pertinent that Christianity during its first three centuries was a religion for people who 
were far from political power. On the contrary, Islam was (almost) from the start the religion 
of a state and the driving force behind one of the fastest and most successful processes of 
empire building known in history. 
 
4.4  Explaining the gap: More radical theories  
Many authors studying the history and culture of the Muslim world have discussed the gap. A 
well-known contribution is Lewis (2002), who observes that a process of cultural and political 
dynamism started in the West with the Renaissance (half a millennium ago). It has gradually 
spread – as a quest for modernization – to the rest of the world, but even if it has often been 
introduced in the Muslim world, it has failed to sing deep roots. In the terminology of 
economics, the spread of modernism has the character of a “club” effect, where countries in 
the club are influenced by each other, but not by outside countries.  
  Others are more radical: Kedourie (1992) argues that “the idea of representation, of 
elections, of popular suffrage, of political institutions being regulated by laws laid down by a 
parliamentary assembly, of these laws being guarded and upheld by an independent judiciary, 
the ideas of secularity of the state….all of these are profoundly alien to the Muslim political 
tradition” (p. 5).  
  Zakaria (2003) qualifies this by claiming that a lack of democracy among Muslim 
countries is not a Muslim problem, but rather an Arab problem:
19 Several Muslim countries – 
most notably Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali and Turkey – are democracies, but (in 
2003) none of the 22 countries in the Arab League have elected governments.
20 He gives 
several reasons for this. First, he notes that the enlightened dictator, and the heroic leader, 
enjoys a revered place in Arab political discourse (Barakat, 1993; Korany, 1994). Second, 
Western countries tolerate the dictatorships of Arab strongmen because the alternative to such 
pro-Western dictatorships is held to be even worse: Anti-western, Muslim fundamentalism.
21 
Third, Israel and the Palestinian cause have become the great obsessions of the Arab world, 
                                                 
19. Our analysis (and Paldam, 2005a) shows that it is a general Muslim problem; but it is (even) stronger for the 
Arab countries than for the other Muslim countries.  
20. However, the partially independent Palestine has recently had a democratic election that was won by the 
Islamist movement Hamas, which is now in government. 
21. Such as Hizbollah (Lebanon), the Islamic Front (Algeria), the Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt).    25
deflecting the attention of its population from the defects of their own society to a preoccu-
pation with the injustice suffered by the Palestinian in 1948, and the endless spiral of violence 
since then.  
  Thus, many reasons have been suggested why Muslim and especially Arab countries are 




This paper had three purposes. First, we have compared the main pattern in the data with the 
predictions from the literature concentrating on the link between income and democracy. The 
survey concluded that the results reported in the literature suggested that the causal link from 
democracy to the level of income is quite weak. 
The second purpose was to “explain” the level of democracy by 5 variables: The initial 
level of income, religion, oil, Communism, and the initial level of democracy. It identified 
three main barriers to democracy: Poverty, Communism and Muslim culture. It was demon-
strated that the effect of income was sufficiently large to explain the democratization that has 
taken place, but then, of course, we come to explain the collapse of Communism in most of its 
former range as being due to pressures generated by rising incomes. 
It was demonstrated that the concept of a (endogenous) democratic transition did 
explain the main pattern in the data. We reached the same result both in a cross country 
setting and in a dynamic panel estimate. The later estimates showed that the level of demo-
cracy adjusted slowly to rising income. 
  The third purpose of the paper was to use the methods of Bayesian probability analysis 
to make explicit the concept of the “risk” of countries being undemocratic. Here, we used the 
distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim countries to show that, by 2004, a country 
which was undemocratic was more than twice as likely to be Muslim than one which was 
highly/moderately democratic. Using a complementary concept of risk, we were also able to 
show that by 2004, even though only a third of the world’s countries were Muslim, the chance 
of an undemocratic country being Muslim was 85 percent of the chance of an undemocratic 
country being non-Muslim. 
We also examined the dynamics of the gap between the level of democracy in Muslim 
and Other countries. It was found to be large but not stationary. This gives the hope that it 
may start to fall, but now it appears to be widening.    26
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Appendix: Some tables 
Table A1. The Gastil score 1972 and 2004 for democracy 
Highly 1972  Highly 2004  Moderately 1972  Moderately 2004 
No Country  G.  No Country  G.  No Country  G.  No Country  G. 
1 Australia   1  1 Australia   1  87 Ethiopia  5.5  87 Bosnia &  3.5 
2 Austria    1  2 Austria   1  88 Iran  5.5  88 Fiji  3.5 
3 Barbados    1  3 Bahamas   1  89 Korea, S.  5.5  89 Georgia  3.5 
4 Belgium    1  4 Barbados   1  90 Lesotho  5.5  90 Indonesia  3.5 
5 Canada    1  5 Belgium    1  91 Nepal  5.5  91 Moldova  3.5 
6 Costa Rica   1  6 Canada   1  92 Portugal  5.5  92 Mozambique  3.5 
7 Denmark   1  7 Cape Verde    1  93 Qatar  5.5  93 Sierra Leone  3.5 
8 Germany    1  8 Chile   1  94 Spain  5.5  94 Tanzania  3.5 
9 Iceland    1  9 Costa Rica   1  95 Taiwan  5.5  95 Ukraine  3.5 
10 Netherlands   1  10 Cyprus, G.   1  96 Tunisia  5.5  96 Venezuela  3.5 
11 New Zealand    1  11 Czech R.   1  97 Yemen  5.5  97 Bangladesh   4 
12 Norway   1  12 Denmark   1  98 Zimbabwe  5.5  98 Colombia   4 
13 Sweden  1  13 Dominican R.   1  Undemocratic 1972  99 Comoros   4 
14 Switzerland   1  14 Estonia   1  99 Algeria   6  100 Gambia, The   4 
15 U.K.   1  15 Finland    1  100 Angola   6  101 Guatemala   4 
16 U.S.A.   1  16 France    1  101 (Armenia)   6  102 Guinea-Bissau   4 
17 Bahamas  1.5  17 Germany   1  102 (Azerbaijan)   6  103 Malawi   4 
18 Chile  1.5  18 Hungary   1  103 (Belarus)   6  104 Malaysia   4 
19 France  1.5  19 Iceland   1  104 Benin   6  105 Nigeria   4 
20 Ireland  1.5  20 Ireland    1  105 (Bosnia &)   6  106 Tonga   4 
21 Italy   1.5  21 Italy    1  106 Cote d'Ivorie   6  107 Zambia   4 
22 Jamaica   1.5  22 Luxembourg   1  107 (Croatia)   6  108 Armenia  4.5 
23 Japan  1.5  23 Malta   1  108 Egypt   6  109 Burkina Faso  4.5 
24 Luxembourg   1.5  24 Mauritius   1  109 Equatorial G.   6  110 Congo (B)  4.5 
25 Malta  1.5  25 Nauru   1  110 (Estonia)   6  111 Gabon  4.5 
26 Colombia   2  26 Netherlands   1  111 Gabon   6  112 Jordan  4.5 
27 Fiji   2  27 New Zealand    1  112 (Georgia)   6  113 Kuwait  4.5 
28 Finland   2  28 Norway   1  113 Ghana   6  114 Liberia  4.5 
29 Gambia, The   2  29 Poland   1  114 Greece   6  115 Morocco  4.5 
30 Guyana   2  30 Portugal   1  115 Guinea-Bissau   6  116 Singapore  4.5 
31 Lebanon   2  31 Slovakia   1  116 Hungary   6  117 Uganda  4.5 
32 Nauru   2  32 Slovenia   1  117 Jordan   6  118 Bahrain   5 
33 Suriname   2  33 Spain   1  118 (Kazakhstan)   6  119 Burundi   5 
34 Venezuela   2  34 Sweden   1  119 (Kyrgyzstan)   6  120 Djibuti   5 
35 Cyprus, G  2.5  35 Switzerland   1  120 (Latvia)   6  121 Ethiopia   5 
36 Dominican R.   2.5  36 U.K.   1  121 Liberia   6  122 Nepal   5 
37 El Salvador  2.5  37 Uruguay   1  122 (Lithuania)   6  123 Yemen   5 
38 Guatemala  2.5  38 U.S.A.   1  123 (Macedonia)   6  124 Afghanistan  5.5 
39 India  2.5  39 Bulgaria  1.5  124 Mauritania   6  125 Algeria  5.5 
40 Israel  2.5  40 Greece  1.5  125 (Moldova)   6  126 Angola  5.5   28
41 Malaysia  2.5  41 Grenada  1.5  126 Mozambique   6  127 Azerbaijan  5.5 
42 Maldives  2.5  42 Japan  1.5  127 Myanmar   6  128 Bhutan  5.5 
43 Mauritius  2.5  43 Korea, S  1.5  128 Niger   6  129 Brunei  5.5 
44 New Guinea  2.5  44 Latvia  1.5  129 Peru   6  130 Cambodia  5.5 
45 Sri Lanka  2.5  45 Panama  1.5  130 Poland   6  131 CAR  5.5 
46 Trinidad &  2.5  46 South Africa  1.5  131 Russia   6  132 Chad  5.5 
Moderately 1972  47 Suriname  1.5  132 Saudi Arabia   6  133 Egypt  5.5 
47  Bangladesh   3  48 Taiwan  1.5  133 Senegal   6  134 Guinea  5.5 
48  Grenada   3  49 Croatia   2  134 Serbia &   6  135 Kazakhstan  5.5 
49  Samoa   3  50 Argentina   2  135 (Slovenia)   6  136 Kyrgyzstan  5.5 
50  Swaziland   3  51 Benin   2  136 Sudan   6  137 Lebanon  5.5 
51  Tonga   3  52 Botswana   2  137 (Tajikistan)   6  138 Maldives  5.5 
52  Botswana  3.5  53 Ghana   2  138 Tanzania   6  139 Mauritania  5.5 
53  Burkino Faso  3.5  54 Guyana   2  139 Thailand   6  140 Oman  5.5 
54  Comoros  3.5  55 Israel   2  140 Togo   6  141 Pakistan  5.5 
55  Djibouti  3.5  56 Lithuania   2  141 (Turkmenistan)   6  142 Quatar  5.5 
56  Nicaragua  3.5  57 Mali   2  142 (Ukraine)   6  143 Russia  5.5 
57  Turkey  3.5  58 Mexico   2  143 U.A.E.   6  144 Rwanda  5.5 
58  Uruguay  3.5  59 Mongolia   2  144 (Uzbekistan)   6  145 Tajikistan  5.5 
59  Bhutan   4  60 Samoa   2  145 Chad  6.5  146 Togo  5.5 
60  Kuwait   4  61 Sao Tome &   2  146 Congo (K)  6.5  147 Tunisia  5.5 
61  Madagascar   4  62 Brazil  2.5  147 Haiti  6.5  Undemocratic 2004 
62  Mexico   4  63 El Salvador  2.5  148 Libya  6.5  148 Cameroon   6 
63  Pakistan   4  64 India  2.5  149 Malawi  6.5  149 Congo (K)   6  
64  Afghanistan  4.5  65 Jamaica  2.5  150 Mali  6.5  150 Cote d’Ivoire   6 
65  Argentina  4.5  66 Lesotho  2.5  151 Oman  6.5  151 Iran   6 
66  Bolivia  4.5  67 Peru  2.5  152 Panama  6.5  152 Iraq   6 
67  Kenya  4.5  68 Philippines  2.5  153 Romania  6.5  153 Swaziland   6 
68  Morocco  4.5  69 Romania  2.5  154 Rwanda  6.5  154 U.A.E.   6 
69  Sierra Leone  4.5  70 Serbia &  2.5  155 Somalia  6.5  155 Belarus  6.5 
70  South Africa  4.5  71 Senegal  2.5  156 Albania   7  156 China  6.5 
71  Brazil   5  72 Thailand  2.5  157 Bulgaria   7  157 Equatorial G.  6.5 
72  Cameroon   5  Moderately 2004  158 Burundi   7  158 Haiti  6.5 
73  Cape Verde   5  73 Albania   3  159 C.A.R.   7  159 Laos  6.5 
74  Ecuador   5  74 Bolivia   3  160 China   7  160 Somalia  6.5 
75  Honduras   5  75 Ecuador   3  161 Congo (B)   7  161 Uzbekistan  6.5 
76  Indonesia   5  76 Honduras   3  162 Cuba   7  162 Vietnam  6.5 
77  Laos   5  77 Kenya   3  163 Czech R.   7  163 Zimbabwe  6.5 
78  Nigeria   5  78 Macedonia   3  164 Guinea   7  164 Cuba   7 
79  Paraguay   5  79 Madagascar   3  165 Iraq   7  165 Korea, N   7 
80  Philippines   5  80 Nicaragua   3  166 Korea, N   7  166 Libya   7 
81  Sao Tome &   5  81 Niger   3  167 Mongolia   7  167 Myanmar   7 
82  Singapore   5  82 P. New Guinea   3  168 (Slovakia)   7  168 Saudi Arabia   7 
83  Zambia   5  83 Paraguay   3  169 Syria   7  169 Sudan   7 
84  Bahrain  5.5  84 Sri Lanka   3  170 Uganda   7  170 Syria   7 
85  Brunei  5.5  85 Trinidad &  3.5  171 Vietnam   7  171 Turkmenistan   7 
86  Cambodia  5.5  86 Turkey  3.5           
Note: The countries in brackets in 1972 were not independent, but members of three larger entities: The Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. We have given all members of each union the same score.   29
Table A2. Model (1) estimated as a cross section for each year, t = 1972, …, 2004 
Year  Const  Ln y -1  Muslim  Oil  Communist  R
2 adj  N 
1972  12.64  (12.7)  -1.13  (-9.0)  0.47  (1.5)  1.80  (4.4)  2.53  (6.1)  0.47  149 
1973  12.48  (12.5)  -1.10  (-8.8)  0.60  (2.0)  1.52  (3.7)  2.52  (6.0)  0.46  149 
1974  12.78  (13.1)  -1.13  (-9.3)  0.39  (1.3)  1.66  (4.1)  2.57  (6.2)  0.48  149 
1975  13.53  (15.3)  -1.22  (-11.1)  0.66  (2.4)  1.66  (4.5)  2.55  (6.9)  0.57  149 
1976  13.81  (15.4)  -1.25  (-11.2)  0.60  (2.1)  1.63  (4.4)  2.57  (6.8)  0.57  149 
1977  13.73  (15.0)  -1.24  (-10.9)  0.47  (1.7)  1.71  (4.5)  2.38  (6.1)  0.54  149 
1978  13.83  (15.1)  -1.25  (-11.0)  0.40  (1.4)  1.69  (4.4)  2.36  (6.1)  0.54  149 
1979  13.21  (14.1)  -1.18  (-10.2)  0.56  (1.9)  1.44  (3.7)  2.44  (6.1)  0.52  149 
1980  12.79  (13.8)  -1.12  (-9.8)  0.84  (2.9)  1.25  (3.2)  2.41  (6.1)  0.52  149 
1981  13.28  (14.9)  -1.19  (-10.9)  1.00  (3.5)  1.19  (3.2)  2.43  (6.4)  0.57  149 
1982  12.54  (11.9)  -1.12  (-8.7)  1.01  (3.0)  1.27  (2.9)  2.73  (6.1)  0.48  149 
1983  13.48  (15.0)  -1.21  (-11.0)  0.98  (3.5)  1.11  (3.0)  2.47  (6.5)  0.57  149 
1984  14.33  (17.3)  -1.32  (-13.0)  0.82  (3.1)  1.52  (4.5)  2.58  (7.3)  0.64  149 
1985  14.41  (17.9)  -1.33  (-13.5)  0.81  (3.1)  1.58  (4.7)  2.64  (7.6)  0.66  149 
1986  14.12  (17.2)  -1.30  (-13.0)  0.86  (3.3)  1.60  (4.7)  2.70  (7.6)  0.65  149 
1987  14.15  (17.3)  -1.31  (-13.1)  0.88  (3.3)  1.45  (4.3)  2.60  (7.3)  0.65  149 
1988  14.09  (17.7)  -1.30  (-13.4)  0.81  (3.1)  1.36  (4.1)  2.50  (7.2)  0.65  149 
1989  14.65  (18.4)  -1.38  (-14.2)  0.79  (3.0)  1.52  (4.6)  2.49  (7.1)  0.67  149 
1990  14.12  (18.6)  -1.33  (-14.4)  0.98  (3.9)  1.52  (4.8)  1.42  (4.2)  0.67  149 
1991  12.62  (14.7)  -1.16  (-11.1)  1.01  (3.5)  1.29  (3.6)  1.05  (2.8)  0.55  149 
1991  11.86  (14.5)  -1.05  (-10.7)  1.03  (4.0)  1.14  (3.5)  2.84  (4.8)  0.56  168 
1992  11.17  (13.6)  -0.98  (-9.9)  1.10  (4.2)  1.31  (3.9)  3.01  (5.0)  0.55  168 
1993  11.45  (14.0)  -1.00  (-10.1)  1.18  (4.5)  1.54  (4.5)  2.88  (4.7)  0.56  168 
1994  11.38  (15.1)  -1.01  (-11.1)  1.49  (6.1)  1.51  (4.8)  2.99  (5.3)  0.63  168 
1995  11.02  (14.7)  -0.97  (-10.7)  1.49  (6.0)  1.49  (4.7)  3.05  (5.3)  0.62  168 
1996  10.81  (14.6)  -0.95  (-10.7)  1.60  (6.6)  1.37  (4.4)  3.13  (5.5)  0.63  168 
1997  10.83  (14.7)  -0.95  (-10.8)  1.58  (6.5)  1.47  (4.7)  3.12  (5.5)  0.63  168 
1998  9.94  (13.9)  -0.85  (-10.0)  1.71  (7.2)  1.33  (4.4)  3.19  (5.8)  0.64  168 
1999  10.03  (14.1)  -0.86  (-10.2)  1.70  (7.2)  1.24  (4.1)  3.19  (5.8)  0.63  168 
2000  10.13  (13.9)  -0.88  (-10.1)  1.62  (6.6)  1.27  (4.1)  3.11  (5.5)  0.61  168 
2001  10.01  (14.3)  -0.86  (-10.3)  1.60  (6.8)  1.30  (4.3)  3.14  (5.7)  0.62  168 
2002  9.86  (13.8)  -0.85  (-10.0)  1.54  (6.4)  1.38  (4.4)  3.24  (5.8)  0.61  168 
2003  9.56  (13.1)  -0.82  (-9.5)  1.59  (6.5)  1.27  (4.0)  3.31  (5.8)  0.61  168 
2004  9.53  (12.7)  -0.82  (-9.2)  1.53  (6.0)  1.35  (4.1)  3.37  (5.7)  0.58  168 
Avr.  12.30  14.8  -1.10  -10.9  1.05  4.1  1.43  4.2  2.69  6.0  0.58   
t-ratio  (7.5)  (8.7)  (-6.4)  (-7.2)  (2.5)  (2.2)  (8.3)  (8.0)  (5.6)  (6.1)  (9.9)   
Note: All coefficients with p-values below 0.05 are bolded. The t-ratios in the last line of the Table are calculated 
for the column above. Model and variables defined in Table 3. We have run all regressions as ordered logit as 
well. The results are virtually the same. 
 
 
 